

# Educational mobility of Hungarian first- and multi-generational young intellectuals in four countries

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**ABSTRACT:** The study examines the characteristics of intergenerational educational mobility among minority Hungarian youth living in Slovakia (Felvidék), Ukraine (Transcarpathia), Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina). The topic is important because in Hungary there is a paucity of studies that systematically analyse the challenges and coping strategies of first-generation students in general, or which go beyond minority aspects within social structures. The paper seeks to fill this gap by exploring first-generation intellectuals' social structure and specific attitudes, based on real life Hungarian-minority experience. Based on a literature review, the authors set up four hypotheses: hypotheses related to social and cultural reproduction, a hypothesis concerning the political consequences of mobility, and assumptions related to minority identity. After testing the hypotheses and comparing the first-generation and multigenerational students' characteristics, the authors conclude that in the minority context there took place a social and status culture reproduction, and mobility increases the likelihood of conservative political attitudes. The immobile stratum of minority multi-generational intellectuals tends to be much more liberal and transnational, using Hungarian citizenship as a new pragmatic opportunity.

**Keywords:** first-generation intellectuals, minority youth, intergenerational mobility, educational mobility

## INTRODUCTION

The topic of minority Hungarian first-generation intellectuals created by school mobility is rather under-researched, but we venture to suggest that it is also rare to find targeted analyses in Hungary (Ferenčí 2003 is a singular exception). In recent years, several writings analysing or presenting minority, Roma life-paths (e.g. Forray 2003, 2004 Székelyi–Örkény–Csepeli 2005, Tóth 2008, Máté 2015, Durst–Fejős–Nyíró 2016, Lukács 2018, Szále 2010) have been published. However,

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studies that systematically analyse the challenges and coping strategies of first-generation students in general, or studies that go beyond minority aspects within social structures, are less common. All this is striking because mobility research in Hungary, as well as the results of the analysis of intergenerational mobility, has been recorded internationally for decades. Our study seeks to fill this gap by exploring the social structure and specific attitudes of first-generation intellectuals, based on real life Hungarian-minority experience.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The theoretical guidelines underlying our analysis are drawn from two major sources: on the one hand, we interpret educational mobility as a specific form of intergenerational mobility; on the other hand, we view first-generation intellectuals as a newly-emerging social stratum, as comprehensively covered by the Anglo-Saxon sociology of higher education. At the same time, this second approach can be related in many respects to new research pertaining to students who have travelled a successful educational path despite being disadvantaged, and who have been called atypical or resilient (Ceglédi 2012, Pusztai–Bocsi–Ceglédi 2016). As we examine the challenges of first-generation intellectuals through the example of young people in minority social situations, we consider it necessary to supplement the socio-political consequences of mobility with values and attitudes derived from minority socialisation and cultural-political opportunities.

### *Educational mobility as intergenerational mobility and its consequences*

Educational mobility means an increase in the level of schooling between generations, and it is also implicitly permeated by the normative approach that in open, modern societies, parents are less and less determined by their (school) education (Róbert 2018). Intergenerational mobility can be examined in the occupational or educational dimension, but also as a result of the effect of several dimensions (education, income, wealth, social capital), as class mobility. This is also the case with the so-called EGP class schema, which is widespread in social mobility research (Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero 1983), and that distinguishes between absolute mobility rates (ratios between origin and target class, i.e. origin-status transitions) and relative rates (the latter are free of structural effects).

The researches usually make country-level comparisons by various mobility indicators, so for example, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that while Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria have low rates of intergenerational mobility, in post-Soviet countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan this is significantly lower (Róbert 2018, Bukodi–Paskov–Nolan 2017, Veraschagina 2012, Gugushvili 2015). Time series comparisons rise the central question of persistency of the effect of social origins upon school attainment. Shavit

and Blossfeld (1993) have argued that almost all countries involved in their analysis show a stability of socio-economic inequalities of educational opportunities. In contrast, other new results (e.g. Breen et al. 2009) demonstrate that there is a decline in educational inequality in several countries.

Indicating the consequences of social mobility and stratification is a topic that emerged in the early years of mobility research. According to Treiman, no matter how and where we measure status, it can be shown that those with higher social status have a more intense interest in politics and public life than those with lower social status; are more tolerant, have better health, and are more integrated into society (Treiman 1970). From the point of view of our study, it is also important to state (pathology hypothesis) that the mobility itself and the status inconsistencies have a disturbing effect. This can be seen in various unusual, anomic behaviours, such as high racial prejudice, suicide, mental disorders, or even political radicalism. Treiman also suggests that the relative importance of parental status decreases with the level of industrialisation of societies, so parental influence is less pronounced in more developed countries. Similarly, pathological effects are more prevalent in less industrialised countries or traditional rural communities, as social mechanisms to support mobility have not been established there (Treiman 1970).

Mobility can also create political and ideological pressure, as a result of which the lower strata must accept the existing order and hierarchy as well, which necessitates a measure of self-restraint and self-hatred. If not adopted, demands for reform could arise, which could also mean political radicalisation. According to Lipset-Zetterberg, it can generally be said that the tension caused by the desire for mobility makes the individual susceptible to accepting extremist political views, but at the same time explains that mobility can lead to an increase in both left- and right-wing opinions. For example, the *nouveau riche* can sometimes be more conservative because they follow social patterns that are perceived as belonging to a higher status. Thus, political behaviour can also be seen as a response to status inconsistency (Lipset-Zetterberg 1970).

Moreover, the change of status induces tension as the individual moves away from his primary socialisation medium, but intra- and intergenerational mobility works differently: the latter is more institutionalised by the 'purifying rites' of education, the former is not so dramatically institutionalised and depends on a profession-specific promotion system. It also follows that intergenerational mobility changes an individual's political attitudes to a greater extent than career progression. (Lopreato-Hazelrigg 1970). At the political level, the fault line is actually between the mobile and the immobile layer: while the 'mobile' want to maintain the existing order in different ways, the 'immobile' are less conservative (Abramson-Books 1971).

Analyses of the impact of intergenerational mobility on individuals' attitudes and socio-political behaviour, mostly in the context of Western democracies (e.g., Turner 1992, Graaf et al. 1995), are often contradictory. Based on analyses of

research drawing on different databases and methodologies, some authors found a negative correlation between upward intergenerational mobility and redistributive attitudes (see, e.g., Schmidt 2011, Shariff, 2015), while others found no correlation, or identified a different trajectory (see, e.g. Clark–D’Angelo 2010, Guillaud 2013). Attitudes towards income inequality, redistribution, and public welfare programs are also very different in the post-socialist region (Habibov 2012, Gugushvili 2016, Cojocaru 2014). Based on data from two international comparative studies<sup>3</sup>, Gugushvili argues that higher intergenerational mobility in post-Soviet countries is one of the reasons for less egalitarian attitudes, while in countries where intergenerational mobility is less prevalent, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, there is higher support for egalitarian political attitudes (Gugushvili 2016).

The political attitudes and mobility experiences of young people were examined in the Active Youth in Hungary research. Based on the results<sup>4</sup>, we can see that the proportion of first-generation students in the student population is higher than that of the total adult population, based on data from international comparative studies (Bauer–Szabó 2009, Szabó 2012). Consistent with the thesis of Lipset and Zetterberg (1970), first-generation intellectual students were found to have more radical political views than average (Oross–Szabó 2014: 88), and were over-represented among Jobbik sympathisers (Róna–Reich 2014: 163, Szabó 2019: 39). They are less characterised by organisational attachment, and due to the plasticity of attachments they are more lonely, which may also increase the propensity towards authoritarianism (Róna–Reich 2014: 151-170). The susceptibility of first-generation intellectuals to political radicalisation is also reflected in their greater acceptance of the further tightening of the current immigration policy, while in the case of those with parents with a high level of education, its support is significantly lower (Szabó 2019: 58).

### *First-generation intellectuals as a special group of educational mobility*

The first-generation layer is formed of skills-based intergenerational mobility, and is made up of people with higher educational qualifications whose parents have not obtained higher-education degrees. By implication, young people were university students before graduating and as such are referred to as first-generation students (Pascarella et al. 1996). First-generation intellectuals are presumably subject to the socio-political consequences of intergenerational mobility, as briefly demonstrated above, but with targeted qualitative and quantitative research their different characteristics can be captured throughout the social structure, as well as within student (youth) culture.

Poor and first-generation intellectuals arrive at the notion of entering higher education later than middle-class children. As the parents of the latter already have

3 Based on research data from European Values Studies and Life in Transition Survey.

4 Data collection took place in four waves: in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2019, empirical social science research examining Hungarian full-time students and college students.

higher-education experience and specific knowledge of the conditions of admission, they plan their children's school life earlier, support secondary school performance in many ways, enrol their children in extracurricular activities and use out-of-school education services. These connections have been repeatedly confirmed by research specifically inspired by the sociology of higher education, and it has also been stated that for children from wealthier families, 'higher education begins before kindergarten' (Gumpert 2007: 60, etc.). At the strategic level of the reproduction of the social structure, however, we already find this idea at Bourdieu when he explains that within the educational reproduction strategy of the upper classes, the transfer of hidden, intangible cultural capital takes place within the family. Thus 'learning ability' is in fact nothing more than a product of parental relationship to time (in other words: planning for the future), and the transfer of cultural capital. In Bourdieu's formulation, the lower classes are always late in finding positive solutions and are risk averse, while the upper classes have intimate information about rare positions and can apply profit-maximizing strategies in addition to a safety net (Bourdieu 1978). Expanding on this, Paul DiMaggio distinguishes between cultural reproduction and cultural mobility: in the case of the former, the elements of cultural capital are organised into a kind of status culture, which is passed down and reproduced across generations. In the cultural mobility model, cultural capital acts occur through social institutions (e.g. school) regardless of family backgrounds, and thus the relative gains of those from the lower classes are higher (DiMaggio 1982).

One of the earliest and most influential student typologies is named after B. Clark and M. Trow, who speak of four subcultures based on the dimensions of commitment to college and intellectual openness: vocational, academic, collegiate and nonconformist. Students living in a career-orientated culture are characterised by a low commitment to the institution and an intellectual closedness, for example, they participate to a lesser extent in the institutionalised life of the university, often take up work in addition to their studies, and, for this reason, their performance is below average. At the same time, they also indicate that these students come from the lower classes and their main goal is to acquire a profession, so they see higher education institutions as a consumer would, that is, as places where one can acquire or 'buy' a profession. (Clark-Trow 1966) Thus, in the context of our present study, we can say that this group is mostly composed of first-generation students.

Analyses examining the impact of higher education institutions on student attitudes and values highlight that being a student makes people more open and tolerant, and this is often the case during university years. As students move from lower to senior years, they become less and less authoritarian, dogmatic, prejudiced and ethnocentric, and at the same time more receptive to political openness and accepting of the importance of individual rights (Pascarella et al. 1996). Moreover, it has been shown that these shifts are not only due to adulthood and responsible thinking due to increasing age, but can actually be seen as the effects of the

institution (Pascarella– Terenzini 1991). It is also due to the impact of institutional and university life that the changing interpersonal relationships of students with peers and the university administration have an impact on the world of values (Pascarella et al. 1996). Other research has also shown that the degree of acceptance of social diversity by students can be related to an institution's commitment in this direction, as well as to the subjects they study and their majors (Astin 1993).

In light of the previous research, the main question for our topic is whether first- and multi-generational intellectuals are affected differently by all these factors during their university years. A number of studies have shown that first-generation students tend to produce lower academic performance, have higher drop-out rates, have greater financial problems, are less resilient, and have lower levels of self-confidence than multigenerationals. These factors are often mutually reinforcing and can even lead to stressful situations due to intense financial, family, or existential issues. It has also been shown that a lower proportion of first-generation students live on campus (in dormitories), and are thereby being left out of the fabric of academic social relationships, along with its benefits. (Markle–Stelzriede 2020, Chickering 1974, Terenzini et al. 1996). This is because a kind of 'propinquity principle' prevails in the dormitories; students live in 'forced communities', encountering ideas and opinions that differ from their own becomes an everyday experience, and this can even have a positive effect on professional-academic performance (Newcomb 1962, Chickering 1974). More research nuances this picture, but the main focus is on the strategic use of the campus, i.e., how students use the campus and how much time they spend on it (Astin 1999, Simpson–Burnett 2019).

It can also be deduced from American examples that first-generation students belonging to an ethnic-minority group are even more exposed to risks that hinder learning<sup>5</sup> (Markle–Stelzriede, 2020), and these challenges persist even after higher education. According to Phinney and Haas, minority first-generation students are forced to take up work for financial reasons to compensate for their disadvantage, so their time is split between employment and university attendance, and they do not always manage to find a balance between the two spheres. Another, so to speak, explicit stressor is discrimination and the perception of majority-minority cultural differences. In addition to their not being able to receive financial and emotional support from their parents, first-generation students from minorities, especially those with a migrant background, often face additional responsibilities from family members and greater involvement in domestic work. A key question is also whether first-generation students or graduates receive support in the recognition and management of stress (Phinney–Haas, 2003.)

5 This issue is a well-known phenomenon in the case of the Roma in Europe, including Hungary. Of course, we are aware that the concept of "minority" has many meanings. In American literature of educational research J. Ogbu (1990) make a difference between immigrant and involuntary minorities. Each minority group has different cultural framework and – among other – different educational strategies.

In Hungary, a survey research comparing first-generation and multigenerational students was conducted at the Széchenyi István College in Győr (Ferenczi 2003). Differences between students were compared across several dimensions, and the results correspond with other international and domestic experiences at several points. It turned out, for example, that in Győr the majority of the visiting students are first-generation students, so a significant part of their time is spent traveling. Relational capital is more important for multigenerationals, and this is accompanied by a kind of higher level of individualisation, as success depends on individual performance. The relationship with the parents is also interesting: for multigenerationals, the family and parental career pattern is likely to be followed to a much greater extent; they also have a higher degree of trust in their parents, while also being more critical of them. Although the author does not reflect on it, there is also a slight contradiction in the assessment of national values: on the one hand, first-generation students sympathise more with national values and graduate parents sympathise with liberal values, but the national tradition and the church are more important for multigenerationals. Here, the national-religious tradition is presumably part of cultural capital, that is family socialisation, and is therefore more important for multigenerationals; also the national idea is interpreted at the political level and as an indicator of young people's radicalisation, as subsequent research has shown (Oross–Szabó 2014).

Utilising a different approach and concept methodology, Hungarian research focusing on higher education resilience also targets first-generation intellectuals. Resilience refers to successful educational life paths despite the disadvantages of family backgrounds, and the students involved can be said to be atypical. Ceglédi (2012) distinguishes between the external (environmental) and internal (psychological) dimensions of resilience at the level of risk factors that support resilience and increase its chances. When examining supportive or disadvantageous factors, the importance of the institutional environment, social capital (friends, model teachers), academic and cultural integration also stands out. (Pusztai 2011, 2015, 2019). Masten, Best and Garmenzy (1990) indicate that local society has three characteristics that support the development of resilient children: the presence of social organisations as role models and resources for students; the communicating of social norms that help members of local societies understand the expected behaviours and attitudes; and the opportunity for children to participate in community life as valued, recognised members. Translated into the world of higher education, this could lead to first-generation role models, professional standards, and integration into the academic sphere. The connection between educational mobility and integration is also obvious on the basis of international experience; recent research in Hungary has also borne this out (Győri–Balogh 2020).

The debates around student typology, higher education impact assessments, and comparisons between the first and multi-generational intellectuals are certainly

instructive for our later analysis. Firstly, they indicate the heterogeneity of students and student cultures, and secondly, they emphasise that first-generation students are likely to behave differently in student relations than multigenerational ones would do. Thirdly, in line with the experience of mobility research, we can also note that first-generation intellectuals relate to the world of higher education not only in the narrow sense, but also as regards personal or professional values, work, labour-market challenges and politics along other value dimensions than their peers. This can be traced back to socialisation and integration in the family or non-higher education spheres, and partly to institutional endowments.

### *Mobility research and national identity research on Hungarian minority youth*

Comprehensive youth sociological surveys, such as the Mozaik 2001 survey, the GeneZYs 2015 survey (Papp 2017) and the 2016 Hungarian Youth in the Carpathian Basin data collection (Székely 2018) were conducted in all four regions. The multi-regional sociological survey of the entire population was first carried out in 1997 during the Carpathian Project survey (Csepeli–Örkény–Székelyi 2002), followed by the Carpathian Panel 2007 survey (Papp–Veres 2007). At the same time, a number of sociological and demographic surveys were carried out in each region, but studies based on these surveys rarely address the issues of mobility or first-generation concerns (in the case of Transcarpathia see Papp 2017a.).

A study examining intergenerational mobility was also based on the data of the 2016 Hungarian Youth Research survey (Bokányi et al. 2018). Depending on the parents' education and job status, the intergenerational mobility of young people was examined, focussing on young people who had already completed their studies, and in the case of parental education, only in relation to the father's education (Bokányi et al. 2018: 143). Upward mobility in terms of education in Hungary is typical for almost half of the young people who have already completed their studies (47%). Amongst minority Hungarian young people living in neighbouring countries it is around 55-60 percent (Bokányi et al. 2018: 144–149). When occupational mobility was compared, they found that among youth in Hungary, 28 percent showed upward mobility; in the case of Hungarian youth in Vojvodina, Transcarpathia and Slovakia this figure was 27 percent, while in Romania it was 22 percent (Bokányi et al. 2018: 153–154).

Hungarian social science studies related to national identity are often used as a starting point for a ‚political/civic’ versus ‚cultural nation’ approach, highlighting differences in the internal logic of categories (Csepeli–Örkény–Székelyi 2002), followed by cross-border research, and this practice was followed with further modifications,<sup>6</sup> including the GeneZYs 2015 survey on which this study is based. While previous studies have indicated the primacy of characteristics of cultural national identity and the less dominant nature of national state criteria (Csepeli–

6 For example, the 2001 MOZAIK and the 2007 and 2010 Carpathian Panel surveys.



Örkény–Székelyi 2002, Veres 2005, Papp–Veres 2007, Veres 2012), the GeneZYs 2015 survey identifies a separate ethnically based concept of nation. Of particular interest is the existence of citizenship in the nation state logics, which was not typical in previous research (Zsigmond 2020). Analyses about the Hungarian citizenship of minority Hungarians living abroad, made available in 2011 by facilitated naturalisation, usually highlights the symbolic and pragmatic aspects of the new citizenship (Papp 2017, Pogonyi 2018). At this point the question is to what measure the first-generation intellectuals use the pragmatic aspect of the new citizenship.

## HYPOTHESES

Our analysis refers to the minority Hungarian youth living in the surrounding countries, and as such provides an opportunity not only to explore the characteristics of the first-generation students in general, but also to get an idea of the mobility-related correlations of the factors arising from the minority situation. We present our hypotheses analytically at four levels, but we are aware that they are interconnected, and the minority dimension is actually present at all levels, even if this is not explicitly indicated.

### *H1. Hypotheses of social status and cultural reproduction*

First-generation people come from poorer social backgrounds, and we posit that this can be demonstrated both at the level of objective indicators (family, the economic situation of parents, disposable monthly income) and at the subjective level. We also assume that parents of multi-generational students (precisely because of their higher education) have a more favourable occupational structure. Since we also assume the early individualisation of the first-generation students, we think they get married sooner and have children earlier.

As a result of holding occupational statuses related to higher education, a larger proportion of the parents of multigenerational students live in cities and towns. Therefore, we assume that to a greater extent, first-generation people come from villages (this trend is also reinforced by higher education expansion). For similar reasons, parents of multigenerationals, regardless of their place of origin, were more exposed to ethnic diversity during their higher education, and subsequently because of their urban jobs. This may also have meant that they were more likely to have an ethnically mixed marriage. As a hypothesis, we can also say that the first-generation students come to a greater extent from an ethnically homogeneous (Hungarian-Hungarian) family.

Partly due to mixed marriage, and partly due to the fact that a foreign language is also assumed to be a resource in the intellectual family, we assume that multigenerational people studied non-Hungarian (i.e. majority or possibly other foreign) languages during their school lives.

First-generation people gained their new status through school mobility, which also means that they had to move away from their parents to some extent, both physically and socially. Based on this, we hypothesise that first-generation people live to a lesser extent still with their parents, and the role of parents in their various decisions is smaller than for multi-generational ones.

From the theories of intergenerational mobility we know that the poorer regions are more closed, so we assume that Transcarpathia will have the lowest proportion of first-generation students.

### *H2. Hypothesis of cultural reproduction*

The cultural background of parents with a high level of education and the patterns they represent are passed on to young people through socialisation. Therefore, we assume that the first-generation students are less familiar with foreign languages than the multigenerational ones, and in their value system, material values are more pronounced than post material values. All this is assumed to be reflected in the level of leisure activities as well. Using the Clark-Trow categorisation, we also think that first-generation people are more profession-orientated, and this will also be manifest in their values.

### *H3. Hypotheses about the political consequences of mobility*

For first-generation students, as part of an upwardly mobile stratum, it is precisely in the absence of parental economic and cultural support that they are forced to seek institutional help more often. Therefore, we think that first-generation students have more trust in the institutions (in democracy), but at the same time they are not as integrated in university life, nor organisational or community life. The latter can be demonstrated at the level of NGO activities. The intellectual background of multigenerational students results in a more intense civic and social life, and it is also likely that they are more interested in public life and politics, more open to challenges and at the same time more tolerant. In other words, we assume that the first-generation students are more ethnocentric; more prejudiced against other ethnicities, especially those representing the local majority, and at the same time more religious. According to the experience in Hungary, mobility is characterised by the radicalisation of young people and their shift to the right, so we can also assume that first-generation people consider themselves to be more right-wing (Szabó 2019, Róna-Reich 2014).

### *H4. Hypotheses of minority identity*

In minority contexts the support of the previously mentioned social institutions and the compensating factor of local integration result in the first-generation students, in terms of their homeland concept,<sup>7</sup> being more identified with the

<sup>7</sup> Their answer to the question of what they considered their homeland to be.

country as opposed to the region. The concept of 'Hungary as home' is culturally imbued, and it is more common among multigenerational people. The acquisition of Hungarian citizenship is interpreted on the one hand as the fulfilment of this concept of 'Hungary as a homeland', and on the other hand it reveals new pragmatic possibilities, therefore we assume that multi-generations demand it to a greater extent. At the level of minority-identity policy, it is often a question of the extent to which a given national minority belongs to the local majority and the mother nation. Since we assume that first-generation students are more ethnocentric, more prejudiced than the multigenerationals, we expect that first-generation students will consider their own minority community to be more a part of the Hungarian nation, and the multigenerational students will indicate that their own community belongs to the majority nation to a greater extent. As a consequence of the former, at the level of national concepts, we assume that among the first-generation students, the state-national and ethnic dimension dominates, while for multigenerational students, the cultural-national aspect is dominant.

## DATA

Our analysis is based on the data of the GeneZYs 2015 youth sociological research in the Carpathian Basin, conducted by the Minority Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in 2015. The focus of the survey was on the nearly 400,000 Hungarian-speaking young people aged 15–29 living in Transylvania (Romania), the Felvidék<sup>8</sup> (Slovakia), Vojvodina (Serbia) and Transcarpathia (Ukraine).<sup>9</sup> The survey of 2,700 people is representative of age, gender, type of settlement and territorial distribution within regions. The sample size was 1000 in Transylvania, 700 in the Felvidék, 500 in Vojvodina and 500 in Transcarpathia (Papp 2017).

Although the research covered many sub-topics: family background, school life, migration, values, media use, political participation, prejudices, minority identity, citizenship claims, and so on, it is important to note that the research design did not include targeted studies of first- and multi-generation students. While this does not preclude a comparison of these two groups of young people in many respects, it certainly limits our ability to examine the world of higher education (one's university experience, the characteristics of university housing, etc.) or a detailed examination of parental roles, as targeted questions are not included in the database. Nevertheless, we believe that the unified database for the four countries is an excellent opportunity to discuss the characteristics of the first-generation students in general and their minority identity political relations.

8 Felvidék translates as Highlands or Uplands, and refers to that part of Slovakia formerly part of 'historical Hungary', with a significant Hungarian minority; this designation will be used from here onwards.

9 By implication, in our analysis, those under the age of 18 were excluded because they were not involved in higher education mobility.

## ANALYSIS, EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESES

In our analysis, the group of first-generation intellectuals included young people with tertiary education or still in tertiary education,<sup>10</sup> for whom neither parent had tertiary education, and for the group of multi-generational intellectuals, those whose father or mother (or both) had tertiary or postgraduate education.<sup>11</sup>

More than half (56%) of the minority Hungarian intellectuals are first-generation and 44 percent are multi-generational (Table 1), almost a quarter (24%) of the total sample<sup>12</sup> are young people with higher education,<sup>13</sup> and 13% of them are first-generation intellectuals in the case of intergenerational mobility examined on the basis of their parents' education.<sup>14</sup>

We find significant differences in the regional breakdown, the upward intergenerational mobility is being less characteristic of the Hungarian intellectuals in Transcarpathia (30 percent). The upward intergenerational mobility is characteristic of just over half of the Hungarian youth in Romania, and more than two-thirds of the intellectuals in the case of Hungarian youth in Vojvodina and particularly in Slovakia (Table 1). Differences in intergenerational mobility between the studied regions can be detected if we examine another indicator, the correlation between the educational attainment of parents and children within the whole sample (see Róbert 2018). If we do this in Transcarpathia it is 0.402, in Vojvodina 0.123, in the Felvidék 0.080, and in Transylvania 0.267.

Table 1. Regional distributions of first- and multigenerational youth \*\* (significant differences, %)

	Multigenerational	First-generation	Total	N
Ukraine/ Transcarpathian	70%	30%	100%	93
Serbia/Vojvodina	38%	62%	100%	153
Slovakia/Felvidék	30%	70%	100%	138
Romania/ Transylvania	46%	54%	100%	259
Total	44%	56%	100%	643

\*\* sign. <0.01

10 For both substantive and methodological reasons, we also included young people still in higher education (still studying) in the category of "intellectual youth". In terms of content, we did this because we think that because we are looking at attitudes, there is no significant difference between young people who are still studying and those who have recently completed their higher education, as these attitudes are largely due to family socialization and cultural capital. Of course, we are aware (occasionally also mentioned in the theoretical part), that it is possible that certain attitudes will change as one ages (and with years of study). Methodologically, it was justified to treat the two groups together, because in this way we could operate with a larger number of elements, making the comparison between first- and multi-generation students more reliable.

11 In the literature, school or occupational mobility is often only counted in relation to the father. In contrast, not only for PC, but also for substantive reasons, we first created a three-category variable referring to aggregate parental education, and then examined mobility against this.

12 N = 2700, total sample size of the GeneZYs 2015 survey.

13 N = 643, subsample of intellectual youth (first and multigenerational combined).

14 N = 361 is the number first-generation students within the total sample.

By gender, we see a higher rate of intergenerational mobility among women than among men. The settlement type also indicates significant differences, with intergenerational mobility being much higher among those from a rural environment. There are no statistically significant differences between the two groups of intellectuals depending on age and marital status, however there are significant differences in the subjective assessment of the family's financial situation. (Table 2).

Table 2. Socio-demographic background (significant differences, %)

		Multigenerational	First-generation	Total	N
Sex*	Male	49%	51%	100%	273
	Female	40%	60%	100%	369
	Total	44%	56%	100%	642
Settlement type**	Village	36%	64%	100%	292
	Town	51%	49%	100%	349
	Total	44%	56%	100%	641
Subjective material well-being *	No problems	52%	48%	100%	119
	Lives within (budgeted) means	44%	56%	100%	437
	Barely surviving	33%	67%	100%	84
	Total	44%	56%	100%	640

\* sign. < 0.05

\*\* sign. < 0.01

We test the hypotheses using logistic regression explanatory models in which the dependent variable represents young intellectual status<sup>15</sup> and examine the chances that each factor contributes to a young graduate being more first or rather multi-generational.

Theoretically, it would have been possible to include new variables related to each dimension in a gradually expanding model, but with an already limited sample the inclusion of new variables would lead to a growing lack of data, and the model would have yielded unreliable results. Therefore, we decided to use the social status reproduction model as a basis, to include the sets of variables belonging to the other hypotheses separately in the models, and to examine the nature and extent of the shifts compared to this basic model.

### *Examination of hypotheses related to status and cultural reproduction (H1 and H2)*

The explanatory power of our status reproduction model is 30 percent. If we supplement it with variables indicating cultural reproduction, this increases to 42 percent. The status reproduction model confirmed our hypotheses at several points. Of the four studied regions, Transcarpathia is the least characterised by intergenerational mobility, in the case of young Transylvanian intellectuals the odds of this are more

15 Bivalent variable, where 0 - multigenerational 1 - first generation.

than three times higher, in the case of Vojvodina people almost five times, and for Hungarians in Slovakia almost eight times. All this also means that Hungarian society in Slovakia seems to be the most open, and in Transcarpathia the most closed, which confirms Lipset-Zetterberg's convergence thesis that mobility rates are higher in more industrialized (Western) societies (Lipset-Zetterberg 1959).

Among the socio-demographic variables, settlement type and financial situation have significant explanatory power. Supporting our hypothesis, first-generation intellectuals are more likely to come from a rural environment than multigenerationals. It is true that if we supplement our model with the variables of cultural reproduction, the effect of the type of settlement will no longer be significant, the variables of cultural capital will override this effect. The effect of subjective financial situation is significant in the models: perceived material deprivation also increases the chances of a first-generation life situation, and this effect is amplified in the model when supplemented with cultural reproduction.

Consistent with our hypothesis, parental occupation is also explanatory, in the case of first-generation intellectuals, the father is more likely to work as a subordinate employee in the private sector, and the mother's public servant or managerial status greatly increases the chances of becoming a multigenerational intellectual. These status reproduction effects are also quite persistent, remaining in the model supplemented with cultural reproduction (and, as we shall see, in the others). Our explanatory models also supported our hypothesis about the ethnic homogeneity of the family of origin, as intellectuals with an ethnically homogeneous family background are twice as likely to be first-generation.

The addition of cultural and leisure variables to the status reproduction model enhanced and refined the explanation. In addition to the structural effects already discussed, it can be shown that cultural reproduction takes place at the higher level of language skills and acquirement. English, the official state language, characterises the multigenerational intellectual habit more consistently, as do out-of-school private lessons, which can be interpreted as part of the conscious schooling strategy (Bourdieu 1978) of parents. Social, 'partying' leisure is also more of a feature of multigenerationals. This is not surprising, as partying is also an integral part of the 'collegiate' students within the Clark-Trow typology, and as such is more of a specific way of behaving for students from the upper class. The effect of post material values is no longer significant in the explanatory model. We also tested whether professional orientation and post material values (Clark-Trow 1960, Terenzini-Pascarella 1977) were significantly present in our student culture, but this could not be demonstrated either (although odds ratios indicate that a diverse life suggests an intellectual family background, while a vocational orientation points toward first generations). Overall, we can say that certain elements of status reproduction and cultural capital are present in a mutually reinforcing way for multigenerational students, which can also be called status culture reproduction (Dimaggio 1982).

Table 3. Explanatory models of status reproduction and cultural reproduction

	Model 1: Status reproduction		Model 2: status and cultural reproduction	
	sign.	Exp(B)	sign.	Exp(B)
Region	**		**	
Reference category: Transcarpathia				
Vojvodina	**	4,85	**	11,95
Felvidék	**	7,72	**	18,43
Transylvania	**	3,40	**	6,46
Settlement type (1 – urban; 2 – rural)	*	1,58		1,17
Sex (1 - male, 2 - female)		0,84		1,13
Age		1,02		1,02
Subjective financial situation1	**	1,65	**	2,12
Possession of family property2		0,94		0,94
Father's main occupation	**		*	
Reference category: Other				
Subordinate, employee (private sector)	**	1,88	*	1,76
Subordinate, employee (public sector)		0,96		0,65
Senior position in private sector		0,50		0,46
Senior position in public sector		0,16		0,29
Mother's main occupation	**		**	
Reference category: Other				
Subordinate, employee (private sector)		1,16		1,33
Subordinate, employee (public sector)	**	0,42	**	0,47
Senior position in private sector	*	0,08		0,10
Senior position in public sector		0,00		0,00
Ethnically mixed marriage of parents (1 -Mixed marriages; 2-Homogenous m.)	*	1,91	*	2,00
Leisure3: intellectual			**	0,86
Leisure: shopping mall				1,23
Leisure: partying				0,68
Leisure: digital consumer				1,16
Leisure: high culture				0,91
Leisure: news reader				1,03
Leisure: sports				0,89
Language skills4: state official language			*	0,77
Language skills: English			*	0,81
Language skills: Hungarian			**	0,41
Did you attend regular private lessons? (1 - yes, 2 - no)			*	0,64
Value5: professional career				1,26
Value: varied life				0,83
Value: world of beauty				1,05
Nagelkerke R-square		0,306		0,418

\* sign. &lt; 0.05

\*\* sign. &lt; 0.01

### Examination of hypotheses about the political consequences of mobility (H3)

Our basic model, supplemented with variables measuring the relationship and attitudes towards politics, achieved an explanatory power of 37 percent (see Table 4). The explanatory effects, already indicated in the status and cultural reproduction models were again found for socio-demographic variables (regional differences persisted, as did the effect of parental occupations and their subjective financial situations), with one exception: political attitudes override the effect of homogeneity of the family of origin. At the same time, political interest has no explanatory power

in the model. To understand this phenomenon, it must also be taken into account that the intellectual parental background favours interethnic openness and tolerance (and a stronger rejection of the majority nation increases the chances of a first-generation intellectual life situation). Based on these, we believe that political socialisation in the family interethnic field strengthens tolerance, but does not increase explicit interest in politics.

However, this openness also resonates at the level of political opinions: first-generation intellectuals are more likely to reject the legalisation of soft drug use, and tend to reject same-sex marriage. Furthermore, we also hypothesised that organizational attachment is less characteristic of first-generation intellectual youth. The explanatory model also confirms it: the lack of NGO affiliation doubles the chances of a first-generation existence. Based on this, we can state that liberalism and tolerance towards majority nationalities and NGO activity are more characteristic of multigenerational intellectual youth.

It is important to note that satisfaction with democracy, trust, the vision of individual and community futures, and religiosity does not have a significant effect. We also hypothesised that first-generation students were more right wing, however, there were no statistically significant differences on the left-right self-classification scale. In this case, however, we have to be more careful, partly because there was a notable absence of responses in answering this question (for both the whole sample – see Zsigmond (2017: 256) and for the target group of the present analysis almost half of the respondents did not answer), for this reason we did not include this variable in our model. On the other hand, from an epistemological point of view, it may also be a question of whether the political left and right poles denote similar concepts for young people living in the four countries.



Table 4. Political participation, explanatory model of political attitudes

	Sign.	Exp(B)
Region	**	
<i>Reference category: Transcarpathia</i>	**	
Vojvodina	**	6,51
Felvidék	**	11,51
Transylvania	**	3,81
Settlement type (1 – urban; 2 – rural)		1,31
Sex (1 - male, 2 - woman)		1,03
Age		1,03
Subjective financial situation <sup>6</sup>	*	1,68
Possession of family property <sup>7</sup>		0,94
Father's main occupation		
<i>Reference category: Other</i>		
Subordinate, employee (private sector)	*	2,03
Subordinate, employee (public sector, civil servant status)	*	0,88
Senior position in private sector		0,42
Senior position in public sector		0,24
Mother's main occupation		
<i>Reference category: Other</i>		
Subordinate, employee (private sector)	**	1,50
Subordinate, employee (public sector, civil servant status)	*	0,48
Senior position in private sector		0,13
Senior position in public sector		0,00
Ethnically mixed marriage of parents		1,51
(1 -Mixed marriages; 2-Homogenous m.)		
Satisfaction with democracy <sup>8</sup>		0,95
Interest in politics <sup>9</sup>		0,98
Civil organisation affiliation (1 - yes, 2 - no)	**	2,16
Tolerance with majority nations <sup>10</sup>	**	0,71
Legalising same-sex marriage <sup>11</sup>		0,89
Legalising the use of soft drugs <sup>12</sup>	**	0,83
Nagelkerke R-square		0,367

\* sign. &lt; 0.05

\*\* sign. &lt; 0.01

#### Examination of hypotheses of minority identity (H4)

By extending the basic model with minority identity variables, the model achieved an explanatory power of 39 percent (Table 5), which is the second largest after the cultural reproduction model. This in itself indicates that understanding the educational mobility of minority young intellectuals is inseparable from the more general minority context. The effects at the level of socio-demographic data persisted in this model as well, and in this case, too, the effect of the existence of inter-ethnic mixed marriages is not as significant as in the reproductive models. The latter is clearly apparent, and may have happened because the effect of this family interethnicity is manifested through factors affecting national identity in several ways.

Beforehand, we expected to find a statistical relationship between intellectual status and the perception of 'country of birth' and homeland: the first-generation students tend to be more identified with the country, while 'Hungary as homeland' was thought to be more pronounced among those with an intellectual background.

In the composite model it turned out that the concept of the 'country of birth' does not have a significant effect, while the perception of the 'homeland' does. In addition, this effect is manifested in such a way that identification with the settlement increases the chances of becoming a 'first-generation intellectual'. This actually refutes our preliminary expectation that first-generation people identify with the country, but also contradicts the fact that the concept of 'Hungary as home' is more likely for multi-generational. At the same time, it indicates a very important (habitual) element: first-generation intellectuals are much more 'locally patriotic' than multi-generational ones.

This local patriotism also practically overrides national concepts: the model seems to associate the existence of the political and cultural concept of nation with the first-generation intellectual existence. While the significantly pure effect of the 'cultural nation' concept is understandable, as the first-generation students live in homogeneous Hungarian families, Hungarian citizenship also appeared in the structure of the political nation concept, and this was applied for by a higher proportion of those with intellectual backgrounds. The apparent contradiction can be resolved if we take into account that Hungarian citizenship also has symbolic and pragmatic implications. In the political national concept of first-generation people, a symbolic factor presumably prevails, while for the multigenerational it has practical benefits. All this can be interpreted as meaning that for multigenerational (or their parents) Hungarian citizenship fits into the status reproduction strategy, therefore applying for it is another pragmatic option. This is also supported by the fact that in our model, the attitude that 'being born Hungarian is advantageous' or a 'political challenge' significantly increases the chances of becoming multigenerational.

Table 5. An explanatory model of minority identity policy

	Sign.	Exp(B)
Region	**	
<i>Reference category: Transcarpathia</i>	**	
Vojvodina	**	6,69
Felvidék	**	4,88
Transylvania	**	3,10
Settlement type (1 – urban; 2 – rural)		1,28
Sex (1 – male, 2 – female)		1,09
Age		1,03
Subjective financial situation	**	2,15
Possession of family property		0,98
Father's main occupation		
<i>Reference category: Other</i>		
Subordinate, employee (private sector)		2,35
Subordinate, employee (public sector)		1,13
Senior position in private sector	**	0,71
Senior position in public sector	**	0,16
Mother's main occupation		
<i>Reference category: Other</i>		
Subordinate, employee (private sector)		1,33
Subordinate, employee (public sector)	**	0,33
Senior position in private sector	**	0,07
Senior position in public sector	*	0,00
Mixed marriage of parents		1,71
(1 -Mixed marriages; 2-Homogenous m.)		
Concept of nation: political nation	*	1,40
Concept of nation: cultural nation	*	1,35
Concept of nation: ethnicity/bloodline		1,17
What do you consider your homeland?	*	
<i>Reference category: Other</i>		
Country where living		1,76
Region where living		1,99
Hungary, the Carpathian Basin		1,32
Settlement where living or born	**	4,63
Application for Hungarian citizenship (1 – yes, 2 – no)	**	2,42
Born Hungarian: advantage	**	0,71
Born Hungarian: political challenge		0,86
Nagelkerke R-square	0,388	

\* sign. &lt; 0.05

\*\* sign. &lt; 0.01

## SUMMARY

In our study, we undertook to compare first and multi-generation intellectuals through the example of minority Hungarian young people across the borders in neighbouring countries. Based on the literature we reviewed, we thought that these two groups have different characteristics as regards social and cultural reproduction, policy responses to mobility, and identity politics arising from their minority situation. Our preliminary hypotheses have been confirmed in many respects, but there are also some that have not been satisfactorily substantiated, which will be the subject of further analysis.

At the level of social reproduction, it has been confirmed that first-generation people are indeed at a disadvantage, with the occupational structure of the parents affecting the young person's current intellectual status. The status of the first generation is mostly increased by the subordinate status of the father; it is further reduced by the public servant or senior position of the mother. Although the occupational structure of parents affects the current status, first-generation students are not necessarily poorer in the objective material dimension. All of this can be interpreted as first-generation parents being less educated and less likely to find senior positions in their occupations, but this is not necessarily accompanied by a disadvantage measured at the income level. Nevertheless, first-generation students consider themselves to be more disadvantaged on a subjective level now, as in the past; they were discriminated because of their backgrounds.

Since income inequality is not necessarily reproduced, we can say that status reproduction is taking place, which is even clearer if we compare the two groups in a cultural dimension as well. At this level, it was found that young people from a higher social class speak foreign languages better and also used additional services more often during their schooling, courtesy of their parents. Overall, this has been interpreted as meaning that in the case of multigenerationals, in addition to status reproduction, certain elements of cultural capital are also reproduced, all of which, in the words of Bourdieu and DiMaggio, result in a particular habit or status culture reproduction.

First-generation existence can also be achieved at the level of political attitudes and student integration. Our explanatory model revealed that while keeping its socio-demographic implications under control, it can be shown that first-generation people share much less liberal political values, are less integrated into student and NGO life, and are significantly more prejudiced than young people from the intellectual families. All this supports the fact that mobility also has measurable consequences at the level of political attitudes, however, the kind of radicalisation and a tendency towards a far-right shift indicated by both domestic and international research (Oross–Szabó 2014, Treiman 1970, Lipset–Zetterberg 1970) could not be detected. Our data is much more supportive of the assertion (Abramson–Books 1971) that first-generation people tend to have excessive compliance constraints, and it is precisely the immobile who are not really conservative.

As we examined young people living in a minority context, the question inevitably arises as to what effects and consequences this particular situation may have. Although we have analytically separated the examination of the impact of minority aspects, the majority-minority relationship was also present in the previous dimensions. In the status reproduction model, for example, it turns out that the inter-ethnic mixed marriages of young parents increases the chances of achieving a multi-generational status, and it has also become apparent that Transcarpathia is the most closed minority society, with the lowest proportion of first-generation intellectuals.

In the case of cultural reproduction, it turned out that even at the level of knowledge of the Hungarian language, the intellectual family background can be seen, and in the political dimensions we also saw that the first generations are more prejudiced compared to the nationalities representing the local majority nation. In the explicit field of identity politics, it was also revealed that in the concept of the homeland, the first generations are much more 'local patriots' than those with an intellectual background, and this also affects the existence of Hungarian national concepts. Examining the existence of national concepts in these two groups by controlling background variables revealed that state and cultural nation determination were more relevant to first-generation students. It is particularly interesting that the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship, which has been available since 2011, is more important for those from the intellectual families, which ultimately indicates that there is a kind of reproduction in the minority-cultural dimension. First-generation intellectuals see their ethnic identity strengthened as part of a status-reproduction strategy; the potential benefits are considered important.

Overall, we can claim that the educational mobility in national minority context is inevitably associated with social and cultural reproductions, and it has effect not only upon political attitudes but on minority identity as well. Our analysis is inevitably limited by the fact that it is based on a research database that did not explicitly examine these intellectual groups, so of course the operationalization was based on ready-made variables. Nevertheless, we think we have managed to point out some contexts that bring us closer to understanding the more general and national-minority context of first-generation intellectual issues.

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